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计算机学院:校庆60周年学术活动系列之二

发布时间:2018年05月10日    来源:计算机学院



单 位:计算机学院

学术报告一
报告题目: Facility Location Games and Resource Auction Games
报 告 人: 李闽溟副教授, 香港城市大学
报告时间: 2018年5月10日 2:00-3:00PM
报告地点: 广东工业大学工学一号馆216室
简介:
       李闽溟博士是香港城市大学计算机系副教授。他分别于2002及2006年在清华计算机科学与技术系取得本科和博士学位。他的主要研究兴趣是算法博弈论,组合优化,以及调度与排序问题中的算法设计与分析。
       Dr. Minming Li is currently an associate professor in the Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong. He received his Ph. D. and B.E. degree in the Department of Computer Science and Technology at Tsinghua University in 2006 and 2002 respectively. His research interests include algorithmic game theory, combinatorial optimization, and algorithm design and analysis for scheduling problems.
       Abstract:Mechanism Design, as one of the important areas in algorithmic game theory, can be classified into two categories: with money and without money.Facility location game is one of the mostly studied problem in mechanism design without money. Procaccia and tennenholtz proposed and studied the problem back in 2009, where there are n agents on a line and the government will build a facility in a certain location given the agents reported information on their positions. Since every agent wants the facility to be closer to her, the government wants to make sure truth-telling is the best strategy for every agent while achieving some optimization objective. Since then, some bounds on the approximation ratios of the truthful mechanisms have been improved and new models are proposed. In this talk, we will briefly explain the story of the classic model and emphasize on therecent development on new models proposed by us and other groups. On the other hand, a resource auction model will also be briefly discussed where jobs bid for time slots from the virtual machines and the objective of the cloud is to elicit truth information from the jobs while maximizing the revenue.

学术报告二
报告题目:Service Matching with Uncertain Outcomes
报 告 人:齐向彤教授, 香港科技大学
报告时间: 2018年5月10日  3:00-4:00PM
报告地点: 广东工业大学工学一号馆216室
简介:
       齐向彤博士是香港科技大学工业工程及决策分析学系教授。 他的主要研究兴趣是运筹学和博弈论,应用领域包括制造,物流,供应链,以及通讯网络等。他的学术期刊编辑经历包括IIE Transactions, IEEE TASE, APJOR 和 FSM,并为以下公司提供咨询服务:HIT, HACTL, Huawei等.
       Dr. Xiangtong Qi is Professor in the Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research interests are operations research and game theory, with applications in service, production, logistics, supply chain, and communication networks. His editorial experience includes Associate Editorship for IIE Transactions, IEEE TASE, APJOR and FSM. He has done industrial consulting projects for HIT, HACTL, Huawei, etc.
       Abstract:We consider a model of assigning a set off servers to dynamically arrived demands, where the outcome is a random reward function of the demand and the number of servers assigned. We show that there exists one type of policy that is optimal to different reward functions. The model has potential for a variety of applications such as sharing economy, online ad auction, charity, and so on.


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